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Abstract : There are various approaches to the problem of how one is supposed
to conduct a statistical analysis. Different analyses can lead to contradictory
conclusions in some problems so this is not a satisfactory state of affairs. It
seems that all approaches make reference to the evidence in the data concerning
questions of interest as a justification for the methodology employed. It is fair to
say, however, that none of the most commonly used methodologies is absolutely
explicit about how statistical evidence is to be characterized and measured. We
will discuss the general problem of statistical reasoning and the development of
a theory for this that is based on being precise about statistical evidence. This
will be shown to lead to the resolution of a number of problems.
Key words and phrases : foundations of statistical reasoning, choosing and check-
ing the ingredients, prior-data conflict, bias, measuring statistical evidence, rel-
ative belief inferences.
1 Introduction
There are a variety of approaches to conducting statistical analyses and most
seem well-motivated from an intuitive point–of-view. If, in any particular con-
text, these all led to approximately the same results, then this wouldn’t be a
problem. Unfortunately, it is possible that mutually contradictory results can
be produced and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is a well-known example of this
phenomenon. Given that these situations can arise, and with very simple prob-
lems, it can lead one to wonder if there are any true foundations for the subject.
With the increasing importance of, what we will call here, statistical reason-
ing in almost all areas of science, this ambiguity can be seen as an important
problem to resolve.
It is interesting to note that virtually all approaches make reference to the
“evidence in the data” or even to the concept of “statistical evidence” itself. For
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example, p-values are considered as measuring the evidence against a hypothesis
although serious doubts have been raised about their suitability in this regard.
Similarly, likelihood ratios are considered as measuring the evidence in the data
supporting the truth of one value versus supporting the truth of another and
the Bayes factor is considered as a measure of statistical evidence. There are
also treatments that recognize the concept of statistical evidence as a central
aspect of statistical reasoning as with Birnbaum (1964), Shafer (1976), Royall
(1997), Thompson (2007), Aitkin (2010), Morey, Romeijn, and Rouder (2016)
and Vieland and Seok (2016). There is also a long tradition of the consideration
of evidence in the philosophy of science, sometimes called confirmation theory,
with Salmon (1973) being a very accessible summary and Achinstein (2001)
being a more recent treatment.
While much of this literature has many relevant things to say about sta-
tistical evidence, it is fair to say that there is no treatment that gives an un-
ambiguous definition of what statistical evidence is together with developing a
satisfactory theory of statistical reasoning based on this. Evans (2015) contains
a summary of a number of publications with co-authors that have attempted
to deal with this problem. This paper motivates and describes that theory and
provides a discussion of its advantages as well as its limitations.
As far as it benefits go, the theory provides a resolution of a number of
problems and this is illustrated via specific examples such as the Jeffrey-Lindley
paradox. It is also noted that the theory can be seen to contribute to a resolution
of a well-known divide in the statistical community between frequentism and
Bayesianism. In essence frequentism is concerned with design: what are the
consequences of the possible data sets that could be obtained and how do we
control for these effects? By contrast Bayesianism is concerned with inference:
given the observed data, what are the answers to specific questions posed? So
frequentism arises when the merits of a study are being assessed and this surely
has an impact on the acceptability of the inferences produced via a Bayesian
analysis.
While there are achievements of the approach taken here to statistical rea-
soning, there are also limitations. Simply put, it is not the case that the theory
produces answers that are acceptable in all contexts where one might deem sta-
tistical reasoning as appropriate. But such situations typically fall outside the
boundaries of what we might consider as acceptable statistical problems and so
require various compromises. For example, suppose one is required to estimate
(µ, σ2) based on the model {N(µ, σ2) : µ ∈ R1, σ2 > 0} and a sample x of size
n = 1 is provided. The estimate produced here is (x, 0) and one could argue
that this is absurd unless it is known categorically that there is no variability in
performances. Clearly, however, this can’t be considered as a context where the
success of a theory is to be assessed. In such a situation some kind of compromise
is required, e.g., basing the estimate of σ2 on a prori beliefs about this quantity.
Such compromises can be seen as violating some very basic principle of sound
statistical reasoning, e.g., falsifiability of the model and prior here. This points
to the need to be careful when identifying what the core problems are to which
the theory is to be applied. Otherwise, the possibility of obtaining an acceptable
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theory seems limited and we would be left with the impression that the subject
lacks a foundation. This isn’t an argument against compromises, but only that
these are made when necessary and that such compromises be clearly identified.
In some ways this is similar in spirit to the distinction made by Mosteller and
Tukey (1977) between exploratory and confirmatory analyses. The concern here
is definitely with the confirmatory aspect and moreover situations where design
plays a role through ensuring data is collected properly and an adequate amount
is collected according to various criteria subsequently discussed. Even further
restrictions are undoubtedly necessary to identify core statistical problems and
some discussion on this will be provided. It is worth noting here too the pa-
pers Brown et al. (2002) and Ripamonti et al. (2017) that discuss appropriate
confidence and testing inferences for some binomial contexts. So it is surely not
correct to suggest that such problems are well-settled even in the simplest of
problems. When compromises are required it seems natural to try and stay as
close to a “gold standard” as possible, so it is necessary to identify what that
is.
2 The Purpose of a Theory of Statistical Rea-
soning
To start it is necessary to ask: what is the purpose of statistics as a subject or
what is its role in science? This is identified here as providing a theory that
gives answers to two questions based on observed data 6 x and some object of
interest Ψ.
E: What is a suitable value ψ(x) for Ψ together with an assessment
of the accuracy of this estimate?
H: Is there evidence that a specified value ψ0 for Ψ is true or false
and how strong is this evidence?
The requirement is placed on such a theory that the answers to E and H be
based on a clear characterization of the statistical evidence in the data relevant
to Ψ.
If the data x was enough to answer these questions unambiguously that
would undoubtedly be best but it seems need more is needed. There are two
aspects of this that need discussion, referenced hereafter as the Ingredients and
Statistical Inference. These are to be taken as playing the same roles in a
statistical argument as the Premises and Rules of Inference play in a logical
argument or proof. For a logical argument may be valid, as whenever the rules
of inference, such as modus ponens, have been applied correctly to the premises
to derive a conclusion, but it is only a sound argument when it is valid and the
premises are consistent and true. An important aspect of a logical argument,
see Kneale and Kneale (1962), is that these two aspects of a logical argument
are not confounded. So the rules of inference are not changed based upon the
premises and further that, in applying the rules of inference, one is not concerned
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with the truth of the premises. The validity of the argument and the truth of
the premises are separate issues. A similar position is adopted here.
3 The Ingredients
There are various criteria that the ingredients necessary for a theory of statistical
reasoning should satisfy. A partial list is as follows.
I1 The minimum number of ingredients are required for a character-
ization of statistical evidence so that E and H can be answered.
I2. The chosen ingredients are such that the bias in these choices
can be assessed and controlled.
I3. Each element specified needs to be falsifiable via the data.
...
It seems clear that in the majority of statistical problems the ingredients are
chosen and are not specified by the application. As such the ingredients are
subjective and that would seem to violate a fundamental aspect of science,
namely, the goal of objectivity. The appropriateness of this is recognized here
but rather as an ideal that is not strictly achievable but approached by dealing
with the ingredients appropriately. I2 suggests that it is possible to choose the
ingredients in such a way that they bias the answers to E and H. This is indeed
the case, but as long as the bias can be assessed and controlled, this need not be
of great concern. I3 is yet another way of dealing with the inherent subjectivity
in a statistical analysis. For indeed it is reasonable to argue that the chosen
ingredients are never correct. In essence the role of the ingredients is as devices
that allow for a characterization of evidence so that the rules of inference can be
applied to answer E and H. Their “correctness” is irrelevant unless the choices
made are contradicted via the objective, when collected correctly, data x. The
gold standard requires falsifiability of all ingredients to help place statistical
reasoning firmly within the realm of science. Compromises to this need to be
explicitly noted and only used when necessary.
So for a theory of statistical reasoning we need to state what the ingredients
are, how to check for their reasonableness and specify the rules of statistical
inference. The following ingredients, beyond the data x, are necessary for the
developments here.
Ingredients
Model:{fθ : θ ∈ Θ} a collection of conditional probability distribu-
tions for x ∈ X given θ such that the object of interest ψ = Ψ(θ) is
specified by the true distribution that gave rise to x.
Prior: π a probability distribution on Θ.
Delta: δ the difference that matters so that dist(ψ1, ψ2) ≤ δ, for
some distance measure dist, means that ψ1 and ψ2 are for practical
purposes indistinguishable.
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So the model and prior specify a joint probability distribution for ω = (θ, x) ∼
π(θ)fθ(x). As such all uncertainties are handled within the context of probability
which is interpreted here as measuring belief, no matter how the probabilities
are assigned.
The role of δ will be subsequently discussed but it raises an interesting and
relevant point concerning the role of infinities in statistical modelling. The
position taken here is that whenever infinities appear their role is as approxi-
mations as expressed via limits and they do not represent reality. For example,
data arises via a measurement process and as such all data is measured to a
finite accuracy. So data is discrete and moreover sample spaces are bounded
as measurements cannot be arbitrarily large/small positively or negatively. So
whenever continuous probability distributions are used these are considered as
approximations to essentially finite distributions. There are a variety of opin-
ions about the use of infinity among physicists, mathematicians, statisticians,
etc., but little is lost by taking this view of things here and there is a substantial
gain for the theory through the avoidance of anomalies.
The question now is how to choose the model and the prior? Unfortunately,
we are somewhat silent about general principles for choosing a model, but when
it comes to the prior for us this is by an elicitation algorithm which explains
why the prior in question has been chosen. An inability to come up with a
suitable elicitation suggests a lack of sufficient understanding of the scientific
problem or an inappropriate choice of model where the real world meaning of θ
is somewhat unclear. The existence of a suitable elicitation algorithm could be
viewed as a necessity to place a context within the gold standard but, given the
way models are currently chosen, we do not adopt that position. Still whatever
approach is taken to choosing π, it is subject to I2 and I3. As will be seen, the
implementation of I2 requires the characterization of statistical evidence and so
discussion of this is delayed until Section 6 and I3 is addressed next.
4 Checking the Ingredients
If the observed data x is surprising (in the “tails” of) for each distribution in
{fθ : θ ∈ Θ}, then this suggests a problem with the model, and otherwise the
model is at least acceptable. There are a number of approaches available for
checking the model and this isn’t discussed further here although the model is
undoubtedly the most important ingredient chosen.
To be a bit more formal note that, when T is a minimal sufficient statistic
for the model, then the joint factors as
π(θ)fθ(x) = π(θ)fθ,T (T (x))f(x |T (x)) = π(θ |T (x)mT (T (x))f(x |T (x))
where f(· |T (x)) is a probability distribution, independent of θ, available for
model checking, mT is the prior (predictive) distribution of T, available for
checking the prior, while π(· |T (x)) is the posterior of θ and provides proba-
bilities for the inference step. Note that Box (1980) proposed using the prior
(predictive) distribution of x for jointly checking the model and prior but, to
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ascertain where a problem exists when it does, it is more appropriate to split
this into checking the model first and then, if the model passes its checks, check
the prior.
A prior fails when the true value lies in its tails. Evans and Moshonov (2006)
proposed using the tail probability
MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (T (x))) (1)
for this purpose. This was generalized to include conditioning on ancillary
statistics, to remove variation irrelevant to checking the prior, and also to further
factorizations of mT (T (x)) that allow for checking of individual components of
the prior, to try and isolate a problem when one exists. In Evans and Jang
(2011a) it is established that, under conditions, MT (mT (t) ≤ mT (T (x))) →
Π(π(θ) ≤ π(θtrue)) as the amount of data increases and so the tail probability
is a consistent check on the prior. Further refinements can be proposed to deal
with invariance and Nott et al. (2018) generalizes (1) to provide a fully invariant
check that connects nicely with the measure of evidence used for inference. It
is shown in Al Labadi and Evans (2017) that, when prior-data conflict exists,
then inferences can be very sensitive to perturbations of the prior.
What does one do when a prior fails? Evans and Jang (2011b) provides
an approach to defining what is meant by weakly informative priors based on
an idea in Gelman et al. (2008). In essence a definition is provided for what
it means for one prior to be weakly informative with respect to another and
further quantifies this in terms of fewer prior-data conflicts expected. This does
not involve the observed data. One can conceive of a base elicited prior and a
hierarchy of successively more weakly informative priors. So a prior for which
conflict is detected, can be replaced by one more weakly informative and one
can progress up the hierarchy until conflict is avoided. The point here is that
final prior is not strictly speaking dependent on the data.
There are many approaches to prior-data conflict discussed in the literature
and this seems to be, like model checking, the kind of problem for which there
isn’t a definitive methodology. The significance of the work cited, however, is
that it presents a package for dealing with the reasonableness of the prior as
part of a theory of statistical reasoning.
5 The Rules of Statistical Inference
There are three rules of inference that are used to determine inferences. These
are stated for a probability model (Ω,F , P ). Suppose interest is in whether or
not the event A ∈ F is true after observing C ∈ F and it is supposed that
both P (A) > 0 and P (C) > 0 with the null case handled via taking appropriate
limits.
R1. Principle of conditional probability: beliefs about A, as expressed
initially by P (A), are replaced by P (A |C).
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R2. Principle of evidence: the observation of C is evidence in favor
of A when P (A |C) > P (A), is evidence against A when P (A |C) <
P (A) and is evidence neither for nor against A when P (A |C) =
P (A).
R3. The evidence is measured quantitatively by the relative belief
ratio
RB(A |C) = P (A |C)
P (A)
.
While R1 doesn’t seem controversial, its strict implementation in Bayesian con-
texts demands proper priors and priors that do not depend on the data. R2
also seems quite natural and, as will be seen, really represents the central core
of our approach to statistical reasoning. R3 is perhaps not as obvious, but it
is clear that RB(A |C) > 1(<,=) indicates that evidence in favor of (against,
neither) A has been obtained. In fact the relative belief ratio only plays a role
when it is necessary to order alternatives.
There are other valid measures of evidence in the sense that they have a
cut-off that determines evidence in favor or against, as specified by R2, and
can be used to order alternatives, see the discussion in Evans (2015). The
relative belief ratio, however, has some advantages, such as invariance under
reparameterizations when continuous models are being used and see Section 7.
As will be seen, any increasing function of RB leads to identical inferences.
Other possible valid measures include the difference P (A |C)−P (A), with cut-
off 0, or the Bayes factor
BF (A |C) = P (A |C)
P (Ac |C)/
P (A)
P (Ac)
=
RB(A |C)
RB(Ac |C) ,
with cut-off 1. As indicated, the Bayes factor can be defined in terms of the
relative belief ratio but not conversely. Since RB(A |C) > 1 iff RB(Ac |C) < 1,
the Bayes factor isn’t really a comparison of the evidence for A with the evidence
for its negation. Furthermore, in the continuous case, when RB and BF are
defined as limits as below, they are equal. So RB is preferred to BF.
Now consider the Bayesian context. When interest is in ψ = Ψ(θ), then
generally the relative belief ratio at a value ψ equals
RBΨ(ψ |x) = lim
ǫ→0
RB(Nǫ(ψ) |x) = πΨ(ψ |x)
πΨ(ψ)
where neighborhoods Nǫ(ψ) of ψ satisfy Nǫ(ψ)
nicely→ {ψ} as ǫ → 0 and the
equality on the right holds whenever the prior density πΨ of Ψ is positive and
continuous at ψ. This definition is motivated by the treatment of contexts where
infinities arise.
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5.1 Problem E
Suppose that the range of possible values for ψ = Ψ(θ) is also denoted by Ψ.
Then R3 determines the relative belief estimate as
ψ(x) = arg sup
ψ∈Ψ
RBΨ(ψ |x)
as this maximizes the evidence in favor and note supψ∈ΨRBΨ(ψ |x) ≥ 1 always
and generally the inequality is strict. To measure the accuracy of ψ(x) there
are a number of possibilities but the plausible region
PlΨ(x) = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) > 1},
the set of ψ values where there is evidence in favor of the value being true, is
surely central to this. If the “size”, such as volume or prior content, of PlΨ(x)
is small and its posterior content ΠΨ(PlΨ(x) |x) is large, then this suggests an
accurate estimate has been obtained.
There are several notable aspects of this. First, in the continuous case, the
methodology is invariant. So if instead interest is in λ = Λ(Ψ(θ)), where Λ is
1-1 and smooth, then λ(x) = Λ(ψ(x)) and PlΛ(x) = Λ(PlΨ(x)). Second, while
ψ(x) can also be thought of as the MLE from an integrated likelihood, that
approach does not lead to PlΨ(x) because likelihoods do not define evidence for
specific values. Third, and perhaps most significant, the set PlΨ(x) is completely
independent of how evidence is measured quantitatively. In other words if any
valid measure of evidence is used, then the same set PlΨ(x) is obtained. This has
the happy consequence that, however we choose to estimate Ψ via an estimator
that respects the principle of evidence, then effectively the same quantification of
error is obtained. This points to the possibility of using some kind of smoothing
operation on ψ(x) to produce values that lie in PlΨ(x) when this is considered
necessary. It is also possible to use, as part of measuring the accuracy of ψ(x),
a γ-relative belief credible region for Ψ, namely,
CΨ,γ(x) = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) ≥ cΨ,γ(x)}
where cΨ,γ(x) = infc{c : ΠΨ({ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) > c} |x) < γ}. To use this region,
however, it is necessary that γ ≤ ΠΨ(PlΨ(x) |x) otherwise CΨ,γ(x) contains
values for which there is evidence against and so would not accurately represent
the evidence in the data.
The following example illustrates that probabilities do not measure evidence,
although this is a common misconception.
Example 1. Prosecutor’s Fallacy
Assume a uniform probability distribution on a population of size N of
which some member has committed a crime. DNA evidence has been left at
the crime scene and suppose this trait is shared by m ≪ N of the population.
A prosecutor is criticized because they conclude that, because the trait is rare
and a particular member possesses the trait, then they are guilty. In fact they
misinterpret P (“has trait” | “guilty”) = 1 as the probability of guilt which is
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P (“guilty” | ”has trait”) = 1/m which is small if m is large. But this probability
does not reflect the evidence of guilt. For, if you have the trait, then clearly this
is evidence in favor of guilt. Note that
RB(“guilty” | ”has trait”)) = P (“guilty” | “has trait”)
P (“guilty”)
=
1/m
1/N
=
N
m
> 1
RB(“not guilty” | ”has trait”)) = P (“not guilty” | “has trait”)
P (“not guilty”)
=
(m− 1)/m
(N − 1)/N =
N
N − 1
m
m− 1 < 1
and Pl(“has trait”) = {“guilty”} with posterior content 1/m. So there is ev-
idence of guilt but it is weak whenever m is large. Note too that the MAP
estimate is “not guilty” . So the prosecutor is correct that there is evidence
of guilt and because, in general, RB(A |C) = RB(C |A) this conclusion would
have been supported if they had used P (”has trait” | “guilty”) correctly as part
of a relative belief ratio but of course the strength measurement would have
been incorrect.
A general weakness of MAP/HPD inferences is their lack if invariance under
reparameterizations. Example 1 shows, however, that these inferences are gen-
erally inappropriate because they do not express evidence properly. Example 1
also demonstrates a distinction between decisions and inferences. Clearly when
m is large there should not be a conviction on the basis of weak evidence. But
suppose that “guilty” corresponds to being a carrier of a highly infectious deadly
disease and “has trait” corresponds to some positive (but not definitive) test
for this, then the same numbers should undoubtedly lead to a quarantine. In
essence a theory of statistical reasoning should tell us what the evidence says
and decisions are made, partly on this basis, but employing many other criteria
as well.
5.2 Problem H
It is immediate that RBΨ(ψ0 |x) is the evidence concerningH0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0. The
evidential ordering implies that the smaller RBΨ(ψ0 |x) is than 1, the stronger
the evidence is against H0 and the bigger it is than 1, the stronger the evidence
is in favor H0. But how is one to measure this strength? In Baskurt and Evans
(2013) it is proposed to measure the strength of the evidence via
ΠΨ (RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) | x) (2)
which is the posterior probability that the true value of ψ has evidence no greater
than that obtained for the hypothesized value ψ0. When RBΨ(ψ0 |x) < 1 and
(2) is small, then there is strong evidence against H0 since there is a large
posterior probability that the true value of ψ has a larger relative belief ratio.
Similarly, if RBΨ(ψ0 |x) > 1 and (2) is large, then there is strong evidence that
the true value of ψ is given by ψ0 since there is a large posterior probability
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that the true value is in {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x)} and ψ0 maximizes the
evidence in this set. The strength measurement here results from comparing
the evidence for ψ0 with the evidence for each of the other possible ψ values.
This is appropriate provided the values are all referencing similar objects. Note
that, using Markov’s inequality,
ΠΨ ({ψ0} |x) ≤ ΠΨ (RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x) | x) ≤ RBΨ(ψ0 |x)
and so a very small value of RBΨ(ψ0 |x) is immediately strong evidence against
H0. Also, when there is evidence in favor, then ψ0 ∈ PlΨ(x) and so the size and
posterior content of this set also provides an indication of the strength of the
evidence.
When H0 is false, then RBΨ(ψ0 |x) converges to 0 as does (2). When H0
is true, then RBΨ(ψ0 |x) converges to its largest possible value (greater than
1 and often ∞) and, in the discrete case (2) converges to 1. In the continuous
case, however, when H0 is true, then (2) typically converges to a U(0, 1) random
variable. This is easily resolved by requiring that a deviation δ > 0 be specified
such that if dist(ψ1, ψ2) < δ, where dist is some measure of distance determined
by the application, then this difference is to be regarded as immaterial. This
leads to redefining H0 as H0 = {ψ : dist(ψ, ψ0) < δ} and typically a natural
discretization of Ψ exists with H0 as one of its elements. With this modification
(2) converges to 1 as the amount of data increases when H0 is true. Some
discussion on determining a relevant δ can be found in Al-Labadi, Baskurt and
Evans (2017) and Evans, Guttman and Li (2017). Typically the incorporation
of such a δ makes computations easier as then there is no need to estimate
densities when these are not available in closed form.
The following simple example demonstrates the need to calibrate the mea-
sure of evidence.
Example 2. Location normal.
Suppose x = (x1, . . . , xn) is i.i.d.N(µ, σ
2
0) with σ
2
0 known and π is aN(µ∗, τ
2
∗ )
prior and the hypothesis is H0 : µ = µ0. So
RB(µ0 |x)
=
(
1 +
nτ2∗
σ20
)1/2
exp

 −
1
2
(
1 +
σ2
0
nτ2
∗
)−1 (√
n(x¯−µ0)
σ0
+ σ0(µ∗−µ0)√
nτ2
∗
)2
+ (µ0−µ∗)
2
2τ2
0

 ,
which, in this case is the same as the Bayes factor for µ0 obtained via Jeffreys’
mixture approach. From this it is easy to see that RB(µ0 |x)→∞ as τ2∗ →∞
or, when
√
n|x¯ − µ0|/σ0 is fixed, as n → ∞. If this is calibrated using the
strength then, under these circumstances
Π (RB(µ |x) ≤ RB(µ0 |x) | x)→ 2(1− Φ(
√
n|x¯− µ0|/σ0)) (3)
the classical p-value for assessingH0. The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is the appar-
ent divergence between RB(µ0 |x) and the p-value as measures of evidence con-
cerning H0. For example, see Robert (2014), Villa and Walker (2017) for some
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recent discussion of the paradox. Using the relative belief framework, however,
it is clear that while RB(µ0 |x) may be a large value, and so apparently strong
evidence in favor, (3) suggests it is weak evidence in favor. This doesn’t fully
explain why this arises, however, as clearly when
√
n|x¯−µ0|/σ0 is large, then we
would expect there to be evidence against. To understand why this discrepancy
arises, it is necessary to consider bias as discussed in the next section.
Another aspect of (3) is of interest because it raises the obvious question: is
the classical p-value a valid measure of evidence? The answer is no according
to our definition, but the difference of two tail probabilities
2
(
1− Φ
(√
n|x¯− µ0|
σ0
))
−
2

1− Φ


[
log
(
1 +
nτ2∗
σ20
)
) +
(
1 +
nτ2∗
σ20
)−1
(x¯− µ∗)2
τ20
]1/2

 ,
with cut-off 0, is a valid measure of evidence. Note that the right-most tail
probability converges almost surely to 0 as n→∞ or τ20 →∞ and this implies
that, if the classical p-value is to be used to measure evidence, the significance
level has to go to 0 as n increases. Note that if the N(µ∗, τ2∗ ) prior is replaced
by a Uniform(−m,m) prior, then the same conclusion is reached as n → ∞ or
as m → ∞. These conclusions are similar to those found in Berger and Selke
(1987) and Berger and Delampady (1987).
6 Measuring Bias
One of the more serious concerns with Bayesian methodology is with the issue
of bias. Can an analyst choose the ingredients in such a way that the results are
a foregone conclusion with high prior probability? The answer is yes and the
situation described in Example 1 is a good example of this. Still it is necessary
to be precise about the meaning of bias and the principle of evidence provides
this. Even though we will use the relative belief ratio in the discussion here, it is
important to note that the bias measures discussed are the same no matter what
valid measure of evidence is used. The approach to measuring bias described
here for problem H appeared in Baskurt and Evans (2013) and this has since
been extended to problem E in Evans and Guo (2019). Bias should be measured
a priori as it can be controlled by design although a post hoc measurement is
also possible. In essence the bias numbers give a measure of the merit of a
statistical study. Studies with high bias cannot be considered as being reliable
irrespective of the correctness of the ingredients. The measurement of bias also
establishes important links with frequentism.
6.1 Bias for Problem H
Consider the hypothesis H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0 and let M(· |ψ) denote the prior pre-
dictive distribution of the data given that Ψ(θ) = ψ. In general it is possible for
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there to be a high prior probability that evidence against H0 will be obtained
even when it is true. In such a circumstance, if evidence against H0 is obtained,
then the result seems highly suspect. Similarly, if there is a high prior probabil-
ity of obtaining evidence in favor of H0 even when it meaningfully false, then
actually obtaining such evidence based on observed data is hardly compelling.
So measuring bias against and bias in favor of H0 are important aspects of this
problem.
Bias against H0 means that the ingredients and the data x, of a prescribed
size, are such that with high prior probability evidence will not be obtained in
favor of H0 even when it is true. Bias against H0 is thus measured by
M(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) ≤ 1 |ψ0). (4)
If (4) is large, then obtaining evidence against H0 seems like a foregone conclu-
sion. For bias in favor, consider a distance measure dist :Ψ2 → [0,∞). Bias in
favor of H0 is measured by
sup
ψ∗∈{ψ: dist(ψ,ψ0)≥δ}
M(RBΨ(ψ0 |x) ≥ 1 |ψ∗) (5)
and note the necessity of including δ so that the measure is based only on those
values of ψ that are meaningfully different from ψ0. TypicallyM(RBΨ(ψ0 |D) ≥
1 |ψ∗) increases as dist(ψ∗, ψ0) increases so the supremum can then be taken
instead over {ψ : dist(ψ, ψ0) = δ}. When (5) is large, then it suggests that
finding evidence in favor of H0 is meaningless. The choice of the prior can be
used somewhat to control bias but typically a prior that makes one bias lower
just results in making the other bias higher. It is established in Evans (2015)
that, under quite general circumstances, both biases converge to 0 as the amount
of data increases. So bias can be controlled by design a priori.
The following example illustrates some general characteristics of measuring
and controlling biases.
Example 3. Location normal (continued).
The bias against and bias in favor can be computed in closed form in this
case, see Evans and Guo (2019). Table 1 gives some values for the bias against
when testing the hypothesis H0 : µ = 0 when σ
2
0 = 1 for two priors. The results
here illustrate something that holds generally in this case. Provided the prior
variance τ2∗ > σ
2
0/n, the maximum bias against is achieved when the prior mean
µ∗ equals the hypothesized mean µ0. This turns out to be very convenient as
controlling the bias against for this case controls the bias against everywhere.
This seems paradoxical, as the maximum amount of belief is being placed at
µ0 when µ∗ = µ0. It is clear, however, that the more prior probability that
is assigned to a value the harder it is for the probability to increase. This is
another example of a situation where evidence works somewhat contrary to our
intuition based on how belief works. Another conclusion from Table 2 is that
bias against is not a problem. Provided the prior isn’t chosen too concentrated,
this is generally the case, at least in our experience.
Figure 1 is a plot of M(RB(0 |x) ≥ 1 |µ) as a function of µ for this problem
when n = 20, µ∗ = 1, τ2∗ = 1. This demonstrates how the the bias in favor drops
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n (µ∗, τ2∗ ) = (1, 1) (µ∗, τ
2
∗ ) = (0, 1)
5 0.095 0.143
10 0.065 0.104
20 0.044 0.074
50 0.026 0.045
100 0.018 0.031
Table 1: Bias against for the hypothesis H0 = {0} with a N(µ∗, τ2∗ ) prior for
different sample sizes n with σ0 = 1.
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Figure 1: Plot of M(RB(0 |X) ≥ 1 |µ) when n = 20, µ∗ = 1, τ∗ = 1, σ0 = 1.
off as the true value moves away from µ0. Table 2 contains values of the bias in
favor for several priors with δ = 0.5 and dist taken to be Euclidean distance. It
is clear that bias in favor is a much more serious issue. To a certain extent this
can be reduced by choosing δ larger, but δ is determined by the application and
really only sample size is available to control bias.
As discussed in Evans and Guo (2019), when τ2∗ →∞ the bias against goes
to 0 and the bias in favor goes to 1 in this problem. This explains the phe-
nomenon associated with the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, as taking a very diffuse
prior induces extreme bias in favor. So this argues against using arbitrarily
diffuse priors. Rather one should elicit the value for (µ∗, τ2∗ ), prescribe the value
of δ and choose n to make the biases acceptable.
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n (µ∗, τ2∗ ) = (1, 1) (µ∗, τ
2
∗ ) = (0, 1)
5 0.871 0.631
10 0.747 0.516
20 0.519 0.327
50 0.125 0.062
100 0.006 0.002
Table 2: Bias in favor of the hypothesis H0 = {0} with a N(µ∗, τ2∗ ) prior for
different sample sizes n with σ0 = 1 and δ = 0.5.
6.2 Bias for Problem E
The accuracy of a valid estimate of ψ is measured by the size of the plausi-
ble region PlΨ(x) = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) > 1}. As such, if the plausible region
is reported as containing the true value and it does not, then the evidence is
misleading. It is argued therefore, that biases in estimation problems be mea-
sured by prior coverage probabilities associated with PlΨ(x) and the implausible
region ImΨ(x) = {ψ : RBΨ(ψ |x) < 1}, the set of values for which there is evi-
dence against. As will be shown, there is a close connection between measuring
bias for problems H and E.
The prior probability that the plausible region does not cover the true value
measures bias against when estimating ψ. This equals
EΠΨ (M(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ)) = EΠΨ(M(RBΨ(ψ |X) ≤ 1 |ψ)), (6)
which is also the average bias against over all hypothesis testing problems H0 :
Ψ(θ) = ψ. Note that 1−EΠΨ (M(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ)) = EΠΨ (M(ψ ∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ))
= EM (ΠΨ(PlΨ(X) |X)) which is the prior coverage probability of PlΨ. So, if
the bias against for estimation is small, the coverage probability is high. Note
that
sup
ψ
M(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ) = sup
ψ
M(RBΨ(ψ |X) ≤ 1 |ψ), (7)
is an upper bound on (6). Therefore, controlling (7) controls the bias against
in estimation and all hypothesis assessment problems involving ψ. Also 1 −
supψM(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ) = infψM(ψ ∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ) ≤ EM (ΠΨ(PlΨ(X) |X))
so using (7) implies lower bounds for the coverage probability of the plausible
region and for the expected posterior content of the plausible region. In general,
both (6) and (7) converge to 0 with increasing amounts of data. So it is possible
to control for bias against in estimation problems by design.
The prior coverage probability that follows from (6) can be considered as a
Bayesian confidence as it is dependent on the full prior. The lower bound on
the coverage probability that arises from (7) only depends on the conditional
priors on the nuisance parameters and such a situation could be considered as
somewhat like the use of priors in random effects models. When Ψ(θ) = ψ then
the coverage probability is a “pure frequentist” coverage probability.
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n τ2∗ = 1 τ
2
∗ = 0.5
5 0.107 0.193
10 0.075 0.146
20 0.051 0.107
50 0.031 0.067
100 0.021 0.046
Table 3: Average bias against H0 = 0 when using a N(0, τ
2
∗ ) prior for different
sample sizes n.
Example 4. Location normal (continued).
Table 3 gives some values of the bias against measure for estimation with
different priors and sample sizes. Subtracting the probabilities in Table 3 from 1
gives the prior probability that the plausible region covers the true value and the
expected posterior content of the plausible region. So when n = 20, τ∗ = 1, the
prior probability of the plausible region containing the true value is 1− 0.051 =
0.949 so Pl(x) is a 0.949 Bayesian confidence interval for µ.
To use (7) it is necessary to maximize M(RB(µ |X) ≤ 1 |µ) as a function of
µ and it is seen that, at least when the prior is not overly concentrated, that this
maximum occurs at µ = µ∗. When using the N(0, 1) prior the maximum occurs
at µ = 0 when n = 5 and from the second column of Table 1, the maximum
equals 0.143. The average bias against is 0.107, as recorded in Table 3.
Bias in favor occurs when the prior probability that ImΨ does not cover a
false value is large, as this would seem to imply, ignoring the situation where
there is no evidence either way, that the plausible region will cover a randomly
selected false value from the prior with high prior probability. Considering only
those values that differ meaningfully from the true value, the bias in favor for
estimation is given by
EΠΨ
(
sup
ψ:dΨ(ψ,ψ0)≥δ
M(ψ0 /∈ ImΨ(X) |ψ)
)
= EΠΨ
(
sup
ψ:dΨ(ψ,ψ0)≥δ
M(RBΨ(ψ0 |X) ≥ 1 |ψ)
)
, (8)
which is the prior mean biases in favor for H0 : Ψ(θ) = ψ0 averaged over ψ0.
An upper bound on (8) is commonly equal to 1 as illustrated in Figure 2
and so is not useful.
Example 5. Location normal (continued).
Figure 2 plots supµ±δM(µ /∈ ImΨ(X) |µ) as a function of µ for a specific
prior and δ. Table 4 contains values of (8) for this situation with different values
of δ.
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Figure 2: Bias in favor of µ maximized over µ± δ based on a N(0, 1) prior with
σ0 = 1, n = 20, δ = 0.5.
n (µ∗, τ∗) = (0, 1), δ = 1.0 (µ∗, τ∗) = (0, 1), δ = 0.5
5 0.451 0.798
10 0.185 0.690
20 0.025 0.486
50 0.000 0.131
100 0.000 0.009
Table 4: Average bias in favor for estimation when using a N(0, τ2∗ ) prior for
different sample sizes n and difference δ.
7 Properties
The inferences possess a variety of good properties and are even are optimal
in the family of all Bayesian inferences. For example, the invariance of the
inference under reparameterizations has already been noted. Another simple
property is the relationship
RBΨ(ψ |x) = EΠ(· |ψ)(RBΨ(θ |x)) (9)
where Π(· |ψ) is the conditional prior for θ given Ψ(θ) = ψ. So the evidence
concerning ψ is obtained by averaging the evidence for each value of θ ∈ Ψ−1{ψ}
with respect to the conditional distribution on the nuisance parameters. This
relationship leads to a result that may appear paradoxical as discussed in the
following example.
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Example 6. Are evidence measures incoherent?
Consider A,B,C subsets of Ω with probability measure P such that P (A) >
0, P (B) > 0, P (C) > 0 and suppose A ∩B = φ. Then applying (9) gives
RB(A ∪B |C) = RB(A |C)P (A |A ∪B) +RB(B |C)P (B |A ∪B).
From this it can be deduced that when RB(A |C) > 1, then RB(A∪B |C) < 1
iff RB(B |C) < 1 and
P (A |A ∪B) < 1−RB(B |C)
RB(A |C)−RB(B |C) . (10)
So it is possible that there is evidence in favor of A but evidence against the
superset A ∪ B. The Bayes factor also has this property and this has been
referred to as “incoherence” of a measure of evidence. It is clear from (10) that
A has to be a suitably small proportion of A∪B for this to hold. But note that,
if C = A, then RB(B |C) = 0 and, even if P (A |A∪B) is very small, then (10)
fails. So the situation is more subtle.
To see how such a situation can arise consider the following. In a population
Ω let C correspond to a trait that exists in subpopulation A ∪B only in A. So
RB(A |C) = 1/P (C) > 1 and RB(B |C) = 0. This implies RB(A ∪ B |C) =
P (A |A∪B)/P (C) and so there is evidence against A∪B iff P (A |A∪B) < P (C)
or iff the probability of possessing the trait within the subpopulation is smaller
than the probability of possessing the trait within the full population. This
makes sense and so our claim is that there is no incoherency in the relative
belief ratio (or Bayes factor) as a measure of evidence. Measuring evidence is
seen once again to be different than measuring belief.
In Evans and Guo (2019) a number of results are established concerning
the principle of evidence. For example, the following result establishes the
unbiasedness of the inferences that result.
Theorem 1. Using the principle of evidence (i) the prior probability of getting
evidence in favor of ψ0 given that it is true is greater than or equal to the prior
probability of getting evidence in favor of ψ0 given that ψ0 is false and (ii) the
prior probability of PlΨ covering the true value is always greater than or equal
to the prior probability of PlΨ covering a false value.
Moreover the principle of evidence is seen to satisfy a number of optimality
properties. For example, suppose another principle is chosen for establishing
evidence against or in favor of a value ψ and let D(ψ) ⊂ X be the data sets that
don’t lead to evidence in favor of ψ. For the principle of evidence this is the set
R(ψ) = {x : RBΨ(ψ |x) ≤ 1}. The rules that are potentially of interest satisfy
M(D(ψ) |ψ) ≤M(R(ψ) |ψ) (11)
as this indicates that D(ψ) will do no worse than R(ψ) at identifying when ψ
is true and is better when the inequality is strict. The following Theorem holds
where part (ii) is the relevant result and part (i) is used to obtain this.
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Theorem 2. (i) The prior probability M(D(ψ)) is maximized among all rules
satisfying (11) by D(ψ) = R(ψ). (ii) If ΠΨ({ψ}) = 0, then R(ψ) maximizes,
among all rules satisfying (11), the prior probability of not obtaining evidence
in favor of ψ when it is false and otherwise maximizes this probability among
all rules satisfying M(D(ψ) |ψ) =M(R(ψ) |ψ).
Now consider C(x) = {ψ : x /∈ D(ψ)} which is the set of ψ values for which
there is evidence in their favor after observing x according to some alterna-
tive evidence rule. If (11) holds for each ψ, then EΠΨ (M(ψ ∈ C(X) ) |ψ)) ≥
EΠΨ (M(ψ ∈ PlΨ(X) ) |ψ)) and so the Bayesian coverage of C is at least as
large as that of PlΨ and so represents a viable alternative to using PlΨ. The
following establishes an optimality result for PlΨ and again it is part (ii) that
is relevant.
Theorem 3. (i) The prior probability that the region C doesn’t cover a value
ψ generated from the prior, namely, EΠΨ(M(ψ /∈ C(X))), is maximized, among
all rules satisfying (11) for all ψ, by C = PlΨ. (ii) If ΠΨ({ψ}) = 0 for all ψ, then
PlΨ maximizes, among all rules satisfying (11) for all ψ, the prior probability
of not covering a false value and otherwise maximizes this probability among
all C satisfying M(ψ /∈ C(X) |ψ) =M(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) |ψ) for all ψ.
If there is a value ψ∗ = arg infψM(ψ ∈ PlΨ(X) ) |ψ), then γ∗ = M(ψˆ ∈
PlΨ(X) ) |ψ0) serves as a lower bound on the coverage probabilities, and thus
PlΨ is a γ∗-confidence region for ψ and this is a pure frequentist γ∗-confidence
region when Ψ(θ) = θ. SinceM(ψ ∈ PlΨ(X) ) |ψ) = 1−M(ψ /∈ PlΨ(X) ) |ψ) =
1 − M(R(ψ) |ψ), then Example 1 shows that it is reasonable to expect that
such a ψ0 exists. Optimality results similar to Theorems 2 and 3 also exist
when considering evidence in favor and are presented in Evans and Guo (2019).
As discussed in Evans (2015) relative belief credible regions CΨ,γ are unbi-
ased and possess optimality properties similar to those stated for PlΨ. Also, it
is always the case that RB(CΨ,γ(x) |x) ≥ 1, with the inequality generally strict.
This implies that there is evidence that the true value is in CΨ,γ(x) and this
is not the case with other rules for forming credible regions. Also, it can be
proved that RB(C |x) is maximized by C = CΨ,γ(x) among all sets C satisfy-
ing ΠΨ(C |x) = ΠΨ(CΨ,γ(x) |x). So CΨ,γ represents those values that have the
greatest increase in belief amongst all the possible γ credible regions having the
same posterior content.
Evans (2015) contains discussion concerning a number of other properties
for these inferences. Overall the inferences derived via R2 and R3 are seen to
have excellent properties.
8 Conclusions
This paper has described an approach to statistical reasoning. The central idea,
which in fact we view as key for any such theory, is to be precise about the
characterization of statistical evidence relevant to a particular problem. This is
accomplished via the principle of evidence which overall plays the major role.
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This principle is intuitively very appealing and, while very simple, has broad
implications. The principle has been extensively discussed in the philosophy of
science literature but statisticians have for the most part ignored it, and that
may well be because of the requirement that prior beliefs be specified via a
probability measure.
Another feature of the approach is a clear separation between the specifica-
tion and checking of the ingredients and the rules of inference. Two necessary
ingredients are a statistical model and a prior. Both of these are based upon
choices made by an analyst, perhaps in conjunction with application area ex-
perts. As such, these ingredients are subjective in nature and it is fair to ques-
tion their validity in light of the central role that the goal of objectivity plays
in science. This is addressed in several ways. One is to acknowledge that the
primary role of these ingredients is to allow for the reasoning process to present
answers to the questions of scientific interest about the real-world object Ψ.
In essence the correctness of the ingredients is not of primary importance and
obsessing about this seems misplaced. Still, it is clear that the ingredients can
be chosen very badly in the sense that they are strongly contradicted by the
data and this may lead to misleading inferences. But there is a scientifically
valid approach to dealing with this issue through checking the model and prior
against the objective, at least if it is collected properly, data. This may lead to
the need to modify chosen ingredients and, at least for the prior, this can be
done in a way that is only very weakly data dependent.
The chosen ingredients can also suffer from an even more serious defect
as the choices may seriously bias the inferences. This bias is measured by the
prior probabilities associated with obtaining evidence in favor of or against. The
principle of evidence is seen to play the central role in measuring and controlling
these biases and can even be considered the optimal way to do this. For us, the
measurement of bias is an absolute necessity in assessing the value of a statistical
study. If there is a high prior probability of obtaining misleading evidence
in a study, then the value of any evidence that reflects this is questionable.
Another consequence of measuring and controlling bias is that it establishes a
cooperative and beneficial relationship between frequentist and Bayesian ideas,
as one can’t do without the other. Frequentism is seen to be an a priori concern
with controlling the inferences that can result from potential data sets, while
Bayesianism is concerned with the actual inferences that follow from the rules
of inference applied to the specified ingredients together with the observed data.
One counter-argument to what has been presented here is that it is very
idealistic, at least compared with many of the problems statisticians commonly
face. Our response to this is that the theory is definitely focused on problems
where, for example, the data collection process can be designed so that ap-
propriate and adequate amounts of data can be collected, where parameters
indexing models are sufficiently well-understood so that priors can be elicited,
differences of importance (values like δ) can be specified and are such that the
computations can be carried out to sufficient accuracy. Such problems are what
might be considered the core statistical problems. If an appropriate theory of
statistical reasoning cannot be developed for such contexts, then there is little
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reason to hope for a theory that can handle the kinds of problems where data
collection is not designed, the data are far too few for the dimensionality of the
problem and aspects of the models used are not well understood so that default
choices of priors are employed. In any case a proposed theory has to handle the
core problems and deal with the concept of statistical evidence appropriately. A
better approach, in our view, is to identify the problems which can be considered
central and, as discussed in the paper, when problems are encountered that lie
outside this core consider compromises to the theory that retain as much of the
ideal approach as possible. Certainly Cao et al. (2015), and Evans and Tomal
(2018) are in this spirit. Additional applications to more significant statistical
problems than those discussed here can be found in the papers cited in this
paper. Of some significance are recent applications in quantum state estimation
that arises out of an approach to inference developed by B. Englert, see Shang
et al. (2013), which has much in common with what has been presented here.
Gu et al. (2019) is an example of this and is one where the concept of bias
played a notable role.
The computations associated with the theory can indeed be difficult. For
the computations associated with bias and prior-data conflict, however, this
is mitigated by requiring only a very low level of accuracy for the relevant
probabilities in question. See, for example, Nott et al. (2016), Nott et al.
(2019) and Wang et al. (2018) where approximate calculation approaches have
been successfully employed. In any case, we subscribe to the view that is better
to approximately compute what is believed to be correct rather than exactly
compute what isn’t. It is notable that most of the hard work involved in an
application is associated with choosing and checking the ingredients and, since
this is the aspect that involves the most thinking about the application and the
relevance of the statistical analysis to it, this is as it should be.
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